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The trend of late marriage is found in various countries across the world in recent years. 
Discussion on this matter in the past mainly explored the problem from a social-cultural 
perspective. This paper attempts a different approach by trying to look at the matter from 
the perspective of both man and women and explains the causes of their actions by 
applying some economic theory. 
 
Statistics as evidence 
Statistics from different countries provide solid evidence in support of an increasing trend 
of late marriage. In Australia, the median age for first marriage has increased gradually 
over time for both males and females. The data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
show that the median age at marriage has increased by 3.64 years for males and 3.58 years 
for females since 1989 (Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Meanwhile, statistics obtained 
from Hong Kong show that the median age of first marriage for males has increased from 
27.8 in 1971 to 31.2 in 2006 and from 22.9 to 28.2 for females (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2009). This upward trend is also observed in Japan and many other Asian 
countries (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2008), proving that late marriage has 
become a global issue. 
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Recent discussions on late marriage 
In the past few years, there has been a spate of discussions pertaining to the phenomenon 
of late marriage. An article published in the Hong Kong Economics Times (Fong, 2007) 
states that the main cause of the trend is increasing independence among women. It 
observed that the number of women in the labor force increased in the last ten years with 
the number of professional women increasing from over 50 thousand in 1996 to 80 
thousand in 2006. These better-educated and employable women tend to dedicate more of 
their time and attention on career advancement, which is a significant cause of the trend of 
late marriage (Fong, 2007). 
  A similar result was found in Japan. Junya Tsutsui (2005) states that it is rational for 
women to marry a man with a better financial position and education level in order to 
“match” with their own increased social status.  
  Ono (2003) provides another explanation for these observations. Based on the theory of 
specialization and exchange, the author states that the roles of men and women in a family 
are highly differentiated. Men are normally specialized for make a living, whereas women 
are specialized for dealing with housework. However, the potential for conflict arises as the 
ability of women to earn money has increased significantly in recent years. By comparing 
the relative opportunity costs, women could arguably be the ones who specialize for 
earning a household’s income nowadays. It is argued that this conflict in roles results in a 
negative emotion in the woman’s mind and discourages them from getting married.  
  Besides the woman’s perspective, Raley, Crissey and Muller (2007) suggest that sex and 
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romance greatly influence a male in the adolescent stage, which in turn affects their 
attitude of marriage. A man who enjoys sex and romance in their adolescent stage tends to 
cohabit in his adulthood rather than having a marriage, which is exactly what is happening 
nowadays. This gives another reason for the trend of late marriage observed in recent 
years. 
 
The Economics of Late Marriage 
In our view, the best way to look at the trend of late marriage using economic theory is to 
start by seeing marriage as any other market. 
The marriage market 
The marriage market is perhaps best characterized as monopolistic competition. There are 
many buyers and sellers (that is, males and females), with a relatively homogenous good 
(that is, marriage) being traded. Competition is mostly of the non-price variety, with 
characteristics such as appearance, wealth and education level playing a role. 
Having a late marriage: from a ‘contemporary’ man’s viewpoint 
An argument presented above is that some contemporary men tend to enjoy sex and 
romance rather than commitment with their partners. Therefore, cohabitation, rather than 
having a marriage, has become their preferred choice. These men tend to marry late in 
their life in order to retain their freedom as well as avoiding the extra responsibility 
brought by the commitment made to their spouse. A marginal benefit curve would provide 
a useful illustration of this phenomenon. Below is a figure showing the difference in 
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marginal benefit between having an early and a late marriage as is likely being perceived 
by such men. 
FIGURE 1: MARGINAL BENEFIT CURVE OF EARLY AND LATE MARRIAGE 
 
The upper part of figure 1 shows the marginal benefit (MB) for an early while the lower 
part shows the MB of having a late marriage as perceived by the ‘contemporary man’. For 
both cases, the MB increases at a diminishing rate and men get married when their MB is 
highest. The MB increases until they have their marriage because the men are enjoying the 
love and romance brought by their partners. However, it is increasing at a diminishing rate, 
because the relationship becomes stable as time goes by, therefore the rate of increase in 
MB is diminishing. 
  After their marriage, such men may see a stable relationship as boring, since the MB 
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brought about by marriage is no longer as much as before as time goes by. With the extra 
responsibilities of family life, they may see having a marriage as inferior to staying single. 
Therefore, their MB may even fall to a lower level than before they were married. 
  What should be noted here is that having a late marriage indeed has increased the total 
benefit (that is, the area under the entire MB curve) for this kind of responsibility-averting 
male. From the illustration, we can see that the total benefit in the period between having 
an early and a late marriage is different and those who have a late marriage are having a 
higher TB. This higher level of TB may result from having more freedom or having fewer 
responsibilities over the entire course of their relationships. 
Opportunity cost and the improved status of women 
From the women’s perspective, an improved social status implies that a greater 
opportunity cost is incurred if they get married too early nowadays. The opportunity cost 
of a choice is defined as the highest valued option forgone. Since women have now become 
better educated and have consequently started to occupy better positions in the work place 
compared to the past, their highest valued option forgone of getting married has also 
increased. This includes the financial gain from their work as well as the self-satisfaction 
and recognition gained from the society. Therefore, the ‘contemporary female’ tends to 
postpone marriage as well. 
  Opportunity cost can also be used to explain the increased search time of “Mr. Right” by 
women. As the education level and financial position of women have improved in recent 
decades, they have tended to look for men who have a similar background or a status that 
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can “match” their own. Therefore, women would ideally like to spend a longer time 
searching for their “Mr. Right”. However, time now has a higher opportunity cost for 
women. This gives another reason that causes the trend towards late marriage. 
Using the demand and supply diagram as a summary 
A demand and supply diagram can be used to summarize the effects that help explain the 
trend of late marriage. Figure 2 shows the demand and supply of the market for woman of 
marriageable age. In the diagram, supply equals to the women looking for a man and 
demand equals to men who are looking for a woman. The quantity transacted is interpreted 
as the number of marriages formed while the price can be interpreted as the price of a 
marriageable-age woman. 
  Both the demand for and supply of such women has decreased and shifted to the left 
(from D1 to D2 and S1 to S2) under the trend of late marriage. Both men and women 
nowadays would prefer to focus on their work commitments and retain their freedom. 
However, the improved status of women is arguably a more significant effect and more 
pronounced in recent decades, causing many more women to quit the market than males. 
This is depicted in the diagram as a greater shift in the supply of women than shift in 
demand by men. The overall consequence of these changes is that the total quantity 
transacted (that is, the number of marriages formed) has decreased sharply from Q1 to Q2. 
Meanwhile, the cost of a man to look for a woman and form a marriage has increased from 
P1 to P2. This increase in cost may include a longer search time even for men, as well as the 
cost to improve their ability in order to win in the non-price competition, such as 
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education and appearance. 
 
FIGURE 2: DEMAND AND SUPPLY DIAGRAM OF THE FEMALE MARKET 
 
 
Interestingly, figure 2 also implies that there has been a sharp decrease in total social 
welfare caused by the trend of late marriage. This is usually estimated simply according to 
the equation:  
Total welfare = Consumer surplus (CS) + Producer surplus (PS) 
CS = the difference between what a consumer (that is, a male) is willing to pay for a good 
(that is, forming a marriage) and what the consumer actually pays when buying it.   
PS = the sum over all units produced (that is, female available for forming a marriage) of 
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the difference between the market price of the goods and the marginal cost of its 
production. 
As seen in the diagram, the total welfare at equilibrium A equals to triangle EAO (sum of CS 
triangle EAK + sum of PS triangle KAO). Due to the trend of late marriage, the equilibrium 
has change to B and the total welfare has sharply decreased to triangle FBG (sum of CS 
triangle FBL + sum of PS triangle LBG). This loss in total welfare for males and females can 
be interpreted as the loss in total social welfare issuing from the theory of specialization. As 
mentioned, forming a marriage implies a specialization in roles, which increases the 
efficiency and productivity of a family and thus the society as a whole. Therefore, forming 
fewer marriages in a society implies that the total welfare of a nation decreases and 
arguably does additional harm to the economy of a nation. 
 
Concluding thought 
This paper used some economic theories to explain the causes of late marriage. The effect 
of having a late marriage is that, families have a narrower window for having children 
within the childbearing age of the wife and a smaller family size as a result. Looking at the 
bigger picture, this trend is one of the direct causes of a lower population growth rate and 
therefore fewer resources for a country to rely on. It is an important issue and every 
society and government should perhaps pay closer attention to sorting out a way to tackle 
this problem. 
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